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LABOR RELATIONS-FLSA ACTION NOT BARRED By PRIOR
ARBITRATION-Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
450 U.S. 728 (1981).
The petitioners were truckdrivers at the Little Rock terminal of
Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc. (ABF). All truckdrivers of
ABF were required to make daily safety inspections of their trucks
before beginning work. If the trucks passed inspection, the drivers
proceeded on their trips and were paid driving time. No wages were
claimed for this inspection time. However, when the trucks failed
inspection, drivers were required to take the trucks to ABF's repair
facility. None of the drivers were paid for the fifteen to thirty min-
utes that it took to perform these duties.
The petitioners filed a series of grievances under their union's
collective bargaining agreement, claiming they were entitled to com-
pensation under article fifty of the agreement, which required ABF
to compensate its drivers for all time spent in its service. Pursuant
to the labor agreement, the petitioners' union presented these griev-
ances to an arbitration committee, which rejected the claim without
explanation. The petitioners then filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging that the pre-
trip safety inspection and transportation time was compensable
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation.
The district court addressed only the fair representation issue,
finding there was no breach of the union's duty. This ruling was
unanimously affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
With one judge dissenting, the Eighth Circuit also affirmed the dis-
trict court's refusal to address the petitioners' wage claim under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.2 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari 3 on the issue of the petitioners' wage claims under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and reversed. Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
1. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 615 F.2d 1194, 1202 (8th Cir.
1980).
2. Id at 1200-01.
3. 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
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I. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS POLICY
AND ARBITRATION
A. Statutory Background
The statutory genesis of United States labor relations law is the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935,4 which established
the basic rights of employees to organize 5 and declared certain em-
ployer acts to be unfair labor practices.6 However, the NLRA placed
few, if any, constraints on organized labor; equalizing amendments
were needed.7 In an attempt to remedy these deficiencies, Congress
passed the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) of 1947,8
which, among other things, made certain actions by unions unfair
labor practices.9 The NLRA was further amended by the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,10 which was
primarily designed to combat corruption and to establish a bill of
rights for union members vis-a-vis unions."
The NLRA also established the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) to implement the NLRA rights to organize and bar-
gain collectively.' 2 The NLRB is empowered to resolve unfair labor
practice charges and to implement the election and representation
provisions of the NLRA.13 Jurisdiction of federal and state courts is
preempted by the Board's jurisdiction when an activity is arguably
subject to section seven'4 or section eight 15 of the NLRA (rights of
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The NLRA was held constitutional
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5. Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). The unfair labor practices are set out in section 8 of the
NLRA. Id
7. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 31 (C. Morris ed. 1971). For a detailed discussion of
the one-sidedness of the NLRA and resulting criticism see id at 27-34.
8. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, as amended by Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541 (codified in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976 and Supp. III 1979)).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
10. Id. §§ 401-531 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11. R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 6 (1976).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976); R. GORMAN, supra note 11, at 7.
13. J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 2.2 (1968). "The Board does not initiate cases. It investi-
gates and decides only cases which are initiated by private parties, either through the filing
of petitions for representation elections, or the filing of charges of unfair labor practices
against employers and/or unions." R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION 49 (1970) [hereinafter cited as R. SMITH].
14. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
15. Id § 158 (1976).
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employees and unfair labor practices).' 6 The unfair labor practice
provisions apply to both unions and employers, the union being the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees.' 7
B. Basic Policies of the NLR4
The congressional policy behind the NLRA was to promote the
peaceful settlement of industrial disputes 18 through the stabilizing
influence of collective bargaining. 19 Congress specifically rejected
the proposal that violations of collective bargaining agreements be
made unfair labor practices and left the enforcement of labor agree-
ments to the "usual processes of the law."' 20 In Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills2' the United States Supreme Court defined "usual
processes of the law" and held that federal courts are responsible for
fashioning a body of common law to enforce collective bargaining
agreements under section 301 of the LMRA.22 Thus, states are gen-
erally preempted from enforcing their own labor relations policies, 23
subject to some exceptions. 24
In furtherance of its goal of industrial peace and stability
through collective bargaining, Congress also declared a national
policy favoring the settlement through arbitration of disputes arising
under collective bargaining agreements.25 Fostering this policy, the
16. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
17. The union has a statutory duty to represent all employees, both in its collective
bargaining and in its enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agreement. Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
18. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
19. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l, 370
U.S. 254, 263 (1962).
20. R. SMITH, supra note 13, at 195-96.
21. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Section 301 allows suits by and against labor unions to
enforce collective bargaining agreements.
23. Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Beas-
ley v. Food Fair, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959).
24. States have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce certain rights created by federal labor
law, Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), and are not preempted in
(1) areas of primarily local concern and (2) areas of only peripheral concern to the national
labor relations policy, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners,
430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional inffiction of mental distress); see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 179-80 (1967) and cases cited therein.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976); Hines v. Amchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562-
63 (1976). "The arbitration process is a method by which parties to a dispute settle it
through adjudication outside the normal judicial system." R. SMITH, supra note 13, at 103.
For the different types and methods of arbitration see id at 110-13; F. ELKOURI & E.
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United States Supreme Court elevated the role of the arbitrator as a
force for industrial peace when it decided three cases on the same
day in 1960, known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. 26 In the Steelwork-
ers Trilogy the Court announced a doctrine of judicial self-restraint
in cases in which the parties have bargained for arbitration as a
means of dispute resolution.27 The Court held that a collective bar-
gaining agreement which has provisions for arbitration is an effort
to erect a system of industrial self government 28 with arbitration the
substitute for litigation and industrial strife.29
While the issue of whether a claim is subject to arbitration is for
the courts to decide, doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion,30 and exceptions should not be read into the arbitration
clause. 31 The majority in Steelworkers made it clear that courts
should not weigh the merits of the grievance32 since it is the arbitra-
tor's construction for which the parties bargained.33 The arbitrator
is not limited to the express provisions of the agreement and is free
to use his knowledge of the practices of the industry and the "law of
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 48-78 (2d ed. 1960); and R. GORMAN, i pra note 11,
at 541-43.
26. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
27. R. GORMAN, supra note 11, at 551.
28. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
29. Id at 578.
30. Warrior & Glf articulated this rule from the collective bargaining agreement in-
volved in that case and indicated that the power to determine the arbitrability could be
vested in the arbitrator by clear language to that effect in the agreement. Id at 587 n.7.
Once a dispute is determined to be subject to arbitration, the promise to arbitrate can be
specifically enforced. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
31. "There is no exception in the 'no strike' clause and none therefore should be read
into the grievance clause, since one is the quidpro quo for the other." United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960). See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), and Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), for the
proposition that an agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quidpro quo for an
agreement not to strike.
32. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
"The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those who
are not a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware." United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
33. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). "When the judiciary undertakes to
determine the merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting the grievance procedure
of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a function which under that regime is en-
trusted to the arbitration tribunaL" United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 569 (1960).
the shop."34 However, the power of an arbitrator is limited. While
arbitration is, in a sense, adjudicative, the thrust of what the arbitra-
tor does is to apply the collective bargaining agreement to disputes
by interpreting the agreement and using the common law of the
shop. He is not a judge and ordinarily cannot resort directly to fed-
eral substantive law when ruling on a dispute.35
One basic thrust of the national labor relations policy is to en-
courage industrial self-government through arbitration.36 In order
to prevent the erosion of this national policy, the Court imposed a
degree of finality in the arbitration procedure by refusing to allow
parties to the arbitration award to bring actions to enforce collective
bargaining agreements under section 301. 37 There were few excep-
tions to this policy of finality, the primary exception being when the
union breached its duty of fair representation. 38 However, two cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court suggested that more
exceptions would be added. In the first of these cases, U.S. Bulk
Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles,39 the Court held that seamen could bring
an action under section 301 for wages under the Merchant Seamen
Act4° without invoking the grievance and arbitration procedures
under a collective bargaining agreement which provided for resolu-
tion of all disputes and grievances.41 In Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v.
Thompson42 the Court granted certiorari to determine whether em-
ployees could sue to recover overtime allegedly withheld in viola-
tion of the FLSA when their complaint was also subject to
resolution under the grievance and arbitration provisions of the col-
34. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
35. The arbitrator draws his authority from the collective bargaining agreement and
does not apply substantive law when construing the agreement. United Steelworkers v. En-
terprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960).
36. So strong is the national policy favoring arbitration, that the NLRB has followed a
policy of deferral to arbitration conducted pursuant to collective bargaining agreements.
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
Although the deferral doctrine has been subject to much litigation and variation, the NLRB
has recognized the importance of arbitration. See, e.g., General Am. Transp. Corp., 228
NLRB 808 (1977).
37. Unless the collective bargaining agreement provides otherwise, employees must fol-
low grievance procedures set out in the agreement, and they are bound by the decision of the
arbitrator. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650 (1965); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
38. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
39. 400 U.S. 351 (1971).
40. 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976).
41. The Court held that section 301 did not abrogate the employee's remedy, but pro-
vided an optional remedy. 400 U.S. at 356.
42. 405 U.S. 228 (1972).
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lective bargaining agreement. However, certiorari was dismissed as
improvidently granted when oral argument revealed that under the
collective bargaining agreement, grievances could be filed only for
violations of the agreement itself-not for all disputes.43
Against this background, the Court, in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.," held that submission of a discrimination claim to final
arbitration did not bar a subsequent de novo title VII suit since
Congress had granted individual employees a nonwaivable right to
equal employment opportunities. Gardner-Denver has been called a
"bombshell" which severely weakens the throne of the Steelworkers
Trilogy.45 Both critics and supporters recognize that the Gardner-
Denver exception erodes the arbitration process because of the one-
sided limitation on the finality of an arbitration award."6
II. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Developing contemporaneously with the national labor rela-
tions policy was the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 4 and
the case law construing it.4  The statutory rights created by the
FLSA were conferred as private rights, but were passed in the public
interest and as such could not be waived or released if such waiver
43. Id at 229-30.
44. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
45. Note, The Gardner-Denver Decision: Does It Put Arbitration in a Bind?, 25 LAB. L.J.
708 (1974). The author states that doubts concerning how far Gardner-Denver will be ex-
tended could tend to undermine the grievance machinery. Id at 715.
46. Criticisms of the decision are that (1) "the employer is confronted with the possibil-
ity of being forced to defend against charges arising from the same set of facts. . . in differ-
ent forums," Note, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 126, 132-33 (1974); (2) it is a mistake to give people a
"second bite at the apple," 1974 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 370 (BNA 1975); and (3) the
Court failed to recognize arbitration as the central institution in the administration of the
collective bargaining agreements, id at 93.
For favorable comments on the decision in Gardner-Denver see Note, Alexander v.
Gardaer-Denver and Deferral to Labor Arbitration, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 403 (1975) and Melt-
zer, The Impact ofAlexander v. Gardner-Denver on Labor Arbitration, 27 N.Y.U. CONF. ON
LAB. 189 (1975). Meltzer claims that Gardner-Denver "reaffirms a classic function of the
grievance-arbitration process: to protect the interests of individual employees, as well as the
interest in industrial order and efficiency." Id at 199-200.
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
48. Congress enacted the FLSA under its commerce power, declaring that the purpose
of the Act was to prevent interstate commerce from becoming "the instrument of competi-
tion in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions." United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); McComb v. Homeworkers' Handicraft Coop., 176
F.2d 633, 636 (4th Cir. 1949). "Substandard labor conditions were deemed by Congress to
be 'injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows."'
Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 576-77 (1942).
or release contravened statutory policy.4 9 The remedy of liquidated
damages cannot be waived in the absence of a bona fide dispute
between the parties over liability,50 nor can it be bargained away by
bona fide settlements of disputes over coverage.'
III. THE FLSA AND ARBITRATION
Early in the development of the FLSA, the United States
Supreme Court held that any contract failing to meet the basic pol-
icy of the Act could not be used to deprive employees of their statu-
tory rights.52 The Court made it clear that congressionally granted
FLSA rights take precedence over confficting provisions in collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 3 Problems later developed when
courts had to decide the impact of a national policy favoring arbitra-
tion on the policy behind the FLSA. Most courts held that suits by
the Secretary of Labor54 for violations of the FLSA were not barred
by prior arbitration.5 5 When faced with actions by individual em-
ployees, the majority of courts held that the mere existence of arbi-
tration provisions in collective bargaining agreements could not
prevent employees from bringing an action to enforce their FLSA
rights.5 6 Nor were employees first required to exhaust their reme-
dies under arbitration.5 7 However, at least one circuit indicated in
dicta that once the election to pursue arbitration was made, other
remedies were barred.5 8
In Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 51 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that employees' right to sue under the FLSA
49. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945).
50. Id
51. D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114 (1946).
52. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 167
(1945); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local 123, 321 U.S. 590, 602-03 (1944).
53. Eg., Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1946);
Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1945).
54. The Secretary of Labor has authority to initiate actions under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 216 (1976).
55. Eg., Marshall v. Coach House Restaurant, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Phillips v. Carborundum Co., 361 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
56. Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (OSHA-FLSA); Brennan
v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., Inc., 482 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1973); Dunlop v. Beloit College, 411
F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Wis. 1976); Phillips v. Carborundum Co., 361 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D.N.Y.
1973); Bailey v. Karolyna Co., 50 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Abbott v. Beatty Lumber
Co., 90 Mich. App. 500, 282 N.W.2d 369 (1979).
57. Eg., Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Phillips v. Carbo-
rundum Co., 361 F. Supp. 1016, 1021 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
58. Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1978).
59. 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
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was foreclosed by the prior determination of the same claim in arbi-
tration. Satterwhite, which became the majority view,6° limited the
reasoning in Gardner-Denver to title VII cases, holding that the stat-
utory policy behind title VII was more pointed toward the individ-
ual employee than was the FLSA.61 Although no court reached a
result directly opposite to Satterwhite, one district court ruled to the
contrary when the Secretary of Labor brought the FLSA action af-
ter arbitration.62 While several courts had held that FLSA rights are
independent of collective bargaining agreements,63 none were faced
with the exact issue presented in Satterwhite. When the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was presented with the issue in Barrentine 4 it
chose to follow Satterwhite and held that an employee's right to sue
under the FLSA was foreclosed by prior submission of the claim to
arbitration. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue.
IV. BARRENTINE v. ARK,4NSAS-BEST FREIGHT
SYSTEM, INC.
In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 65 Justice
Brennan, speaking for the majority, recognized that two aspects of
the national labor policy were in tension: (1) the labor relations
policy encouraging the settlement of labor disputes through collec-
tive bargaining and (2) labor statutes affording individual employ-
ees specific substantive rights.' The national policy favoring
collective bargaining and industrial self-government is illustrative of
Congress' determination to promote industrial peace. 67 In accord-
ance with this policy, courts usually defer to the arbitration process
as a means of resolving disputes arising out of the collective bar-
60. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico Local 901 v. Flagship Hotel Corp., 554 F.2d 8
(1st Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Coach House Restaurant, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Atterburg v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.J. 1977); Abbott v. Beatty
Lumber Co., 90 Mich. App. 500, 282 N.W.2d 369 (1979).
61. 496 F.2d at 450.
62. Marshall v. Coach House Restaurant, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). How-
ever, the court followed Satterwhite and stated that if the employee had brought the action,
principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel would prevent reassertion of a claim previ-
ously resolved through arbitration.
63. E.g., Leyva v. Certified Grocers, Ltd., 593 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
827 (1979); Brennan v. Board of Educ., 374 F. Supp. 817 (D.N.J. 1974); Hodgson v. Sagner,
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 371 (D. Md. 1971), aj'daub nom Hodgson v. Baltimore Regional Joint
Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 462 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1972).
64. 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
65. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
66. Id at 734.
67. Id at 735.
gaining process.68 However, in rejecting ABF's argument that this
policy barred the petitioners from bringing the FLSA claim in fed-
eral court, the Court held that different considerations apply when
the employee's claim is based on federal statutory rights designed to
provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers.
Not all disputes between an employee and his employer are suited
for arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement.69
Refusing to limit the reasoning in Gardner-Denver to title VII
cases, the Court stated that FLSA rights also could not be waived by
contract because this would nullify the purposes of the statute and
thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.7 0 The
FLSA, like title VII, grants individual employees access to the
courts, and arbitration procedures are an inadequate forum for the
enforcement of these rights.7'
The majority noted that FLSA rights could be lost if submis-
sion of a claim to arbitration precluded employees from bringing a
FLSA suit in federal court. First, even if the employee's claim were
meritorious, his union might decide in good faith not to vigorously
support the claim in arbitration.72 Second, even when the union
vigorously presents the employee's claim, the employee's statutory
rights may not be adequately protected since the arbitrator's role is
to apply the "law of the shop" and not the law of the land.73 Fur-
thermore, an arbitrator's power is derived from the collective bar-
gaining agreement, and he may not have the power to grant the
broad range of relief available under the FLSA.
The Court concluded by stating that FLSA rights are independ-
ent of the collective bargaining process and are for the protection of
the individual workers. 74 Since Congress intended to give individ-
ual employees these FLSA rights, the Court held that the petition-
ers' claim was not barred by the prior submission of their grievance
to arbitration.75
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented,
arguing that the Court's decision ignored the strong congressional
68. Id at 736.
69. Id at 737.
70. Id at 740.
71. Id at 739-40.
72. Id at 742.
73. Id at 743.
74. Id at 745.
75. Id
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policy favoring arbitration as a method of resolving labor disputes.76
He distinguished Gardner-Denver because it was based on discrimi-
nation in violation of the Civil Rights Act, which is vastly different
from the relatively typical and simple wage dispute involved in this
case. 77 The Chief Justice argued that this wage claim presented a
factual question well suited for disposition by grievance processes
and arbitration.78 He asserted that it increases costs and unnecessa-
rily consumes judicial time to allow one party to an elementary in-
dustrial dispute to resort to the federal courts when the parties had
already resorted to an established, simplified, and less costly
procedure.79
Although the majority did not indicate how far its rationale
would be carried, a logical extension of the holding in Barrentine
would allow employees to sue on previously arbitrated claims which
involve violation of a protective federal statute.80 Such extensions
should be made on a case by case basis,8' with the courts balancing
the congressional purpose behind the two conflicting policies.82 The
rationale in Barrentine should not be limited to federal statutes, but
should also be applied to administrative regulations of federal agen-
cies since the agencies are charged with effectuating congressional
intent behind such statutes.8 3 However, it is doubtful that the ra-
76. Id at 746 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id at 749.
78. Id at 751.
79. Id at 752.
80. In Marshall v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 618 F.2d 1220, 1222-23 (7th Cir. 1980), the court
held that giving preclusive effect to an arbitrator's decision would be inconsistent with the
statutory purpose behind the Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
678 (1976). See also Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (OSHA-
FLSA); Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (EEOC-
ADEA).
81. "When an employee asserts rights derived from a federal statute, 'the presumption
of comprehensiveness of the arbitral remedy is . . . rebutted.'" Tuma v. American Can
Co., 373 F. Supp. 218, 229 n.15 (D.N.J. 1974) (quoting U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles,
400 U.S. 351, 362 (1971)).
82. Factors which should be considered include (1) the public interest, if any, in the
rights being infringed; (2) whether the employee was forced to go through arbitration before
pursuing his statutory rights; (3) whether the right can be waived by the employee;
(4) whether enforcement of the arbitration award would nullify the purposes of the conffict-
ing statute; and (5) the importance of the right protected, e.g., sex or race discrimination.
83. This is not an argument for blanket application, but for application after undergo-
ing the weighing process discussed supra note 82.
In Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico Local 901 v. Flagship Hotel Corp., 554 F.2d 8
(1st Cir. 1977), the court was faced with this issue and chose to follow the Satterwhiie rule.
This holding seems to frustrate governmental policy because the administrative agencies are
vested with the responsibility of effectuating the governmental purpose behind the statutes.
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tionale in Barrentine will be extended to allow employees to main-
tain a similar action under comparable state labor legislation.84
Critics may argue that the increasing number of exceptions to
the finality of arbitration awards will weaken the national policy of
industrial self-government; 85 however, arbitration awards are based
on collective bargaining agreements, and the arbitrator does not
have authority to invoke substantive law.86 Therefore, the standard
used in ruling on an FLSA claim may necessarily be different than
the standard used in considering the same claim brought before an
arbitrator under a collective bargaining agreement.87
Patrick R. James
84. While states are free to legislate in this area, Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S.
310 (1960), they will not be permitted to frustrate the national labor relations policy. See
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 45-46 for criticisms of Gardner-Denver.
86. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974).
87. It is true that the employee does get "two bites at the apple," but this is a necessary
cost of protecting individual rights. See 1974 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK, supra note 46.
The decision in Barrentine also prevents unequal treatment for co-employees who de-
cide to file an action in federal court and those who go to arbitration. Since employees do
not have to pay for arbitration (the union does), they are more likely to attempt arbitration
first. If the dispute is settled under the grievance procedures the employee need go no fur-
ther, but if the arbitrator decides contrary to the federal statute the employee still has an-
other avenue for relief. This decreases the number of claims going to federal courts and, at
the same time, preserves basic protections embodied in the applicable federal statute.

